

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS - TRANSMISSION IN EUROPE

CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT




2008: subprime crisis


2009: Lehman brothers default


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



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

























































































































EURO BREAK UP PROBABILITY

By weighting the *Target 2* net balance with the probability of an Euro break-up, it's possible to build a quantitative measure of potential loss for the main Euro Zone countries



REVISION OF THE EUROSYSTEM RULES



- Partial Debt Monetization
- Review of TARGET2 system
- Review of Fiscal Compact
- Banking union and european handling of crisis
- Strengthening of Transparency Rules

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REVISION OF THE EUROSYSTEM RULES




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
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
PARTIAL DEBT MONETIZATION





- Using GDP of the EU countries as a metric to identify the $\mbox{\bf quote}$ of debt to be cancelled
- 30% of debt to be monetized is around 3.000 bln euros
- Italy debt/gdp ratio would become close to 100%

















PARTIAL DEBT MONETIZATION




JUNE 2014:

The decision of ECB to suspend the sterilization of the residual 164 bln of € injected in the financial system with the *Securities Market Programme* is a right step in the direction of a partial debt monetization



Refund of the interest paid on government bonds to the issuer countries (with QE FED makes it)







40%

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PARTIAL DEBT MONETIZATION




At the present, peripheral countries that adhered to SMP program pay interests on debt to ECB




ECB REDISTRIBUTES 90% OF INTEREST PROFITS TO EURO ZONE CENTRAL BANKS



If SMP transforms into a full QE, it's not acceptable that part of interest payments of PIIGS are transferred to *core* countries



EXIT FROM THE CRISIS



Restoring a unique interest rate term structure and a physiological behavior of the Monetary Union brings back Europe on a stable growth path.

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THE ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS OF FISCAL COMPACT

- The effects of "legge fornero" and the phenomenon of «esodati» are determined by the increase of the Debt / GDP ratio
- A level of Debt / GDP ratio greater than 140% will determine another hard cut to public pensions
- in 2017 the debt brake rule of 1/20 worths 50 billions and requires more than 100 billions of primary surplus, with a reduction of 5% of Debt / GDP ratio

Data in billion of €	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Debt / GDP ratio	127,0%	132,9%	132,8%	129,4%	125,0%	120,1%
GDP at current prices	1565,9	1557,3	1602,9	1660,7	1718,4	1751,0
Target Debt	1988,7	2069,7	2128,7	2148,9	2148,0	2103,0
Interests on Debt (estimate)	81,4	89,7	89,2	91,5	97,5	101,5
Primary Surplus (estimate)	102,3	83,5	58,1	52,4	79,3	100,3
Nominal Deficit (estimate)	3,0%	3,0%	2,5%	1,6%	0,8%	0,1%
Deficit to be financed at						
current prices	47,0	46,7	40,1	26,6	13,7	1,8
Bb(t) Fiscal Compact						
parameter				124,1%	124,7%	122,3%
Fiscal Compact Impact				26,6	14,7	46,7

Official Data Official Estimate MEF Author's Estimate


(data source: MEF report - update Fall 2013)


THE EXIT FROM THE CRISIS SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY TRANSPARENCY REGULATION



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MOBILISING THE SAVINGS STOCKS THROUGH RISK TRANSPARENCY

Strenghtening the safeguards through a regulation aimed to the **overcoming of information asymmetry** between the seller and the buyer of financial products

(SEE "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", 1970 George Akerlof).



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RISK TRANSPARENCY – AN INTRODUCTION





INVESTMENT PROPOSAL TO RETAIL INVESTOR Bonus Plus Certificate with underlying represented by the Mediobanca stock

LET'S TRY TO RETRIEVE SOME INFORMATION FROM THE INFORMATION SHEET GIVEN TO THE INVESTOR

